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Abstract 
Many countries around the world are presently reporting a shortage of doctors. To 
understand the situation better, this paper reviews the current English language 
literature on the supply of doctors in developed and developing countries with a special 
interest in Australia. The definition of doctor shortage and the accepted ratio of patients 
to full-time equivalent (FTE) doctors that is followed in this paper, is the one that is 
provided by the Australian Government’s Department of Health and Ageing. The issue of 
supply imbalance with respect to doctors is one that is particularly controversial in 
Australia, with some policy-makers arguing that it is a problem of under-utilisation of 
existing doctors, not under supply. The paper focuses on the literature on (1) mobility 
issues relating to geographical and sectoral imbalances, (2) incentive issues (monetary 
and non-monetary) relating to medical specialisation imbalance and (3) government 
regulation issues relating to geographical, sectoral and professional specialisation 
imbalances. The paper offers some suggestions to deal with the problem of supply 
imbalance. One of the key findings is that developed countries such as Australia cannot 
continue to rely on foreign-born overseas trained doctors to fill the gaps in supply. 
Hence, to solve the medical workforce crisis, Australia will have to increase the number 
of doctors being trained.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Many countries around the world are presently reporting a shortage of doctors. One such 
country is Australia. The usual reasons given for a shortage of doctors in economically 
developed countries like Australia and Canada include an increase in the number of 
physicians migrating to other countries, the early retirement of the baby-boomer 
generation of doctors, and reduced hours worked by those doctors opting for a more 
relaxed lifestyle. In addition, some doctors these days are also choosing less demanding 
specialties, and restricting their practices to particular types of cases or services (Stoddart 
& Barer, 1999). 
 
The definition of doctor shortage this paper follows is provided by the Australian 
Government’s Department of Health and Ageing. The department defines a district of 
workforce shortage as a geographic area in which the population’s demand for healthcare 
is not fully met. Population demands are considered not fully met when a community has 
less access than the national average to medical services. In other words, in a district of 
workforce shortage, the ratio of full-time equivalent (FTE) doctors to patients would be 
greater than 0.71:1,000 (Australian Department of Health and Ageing, 2005). We accept 
that this ratio of patients to FTE doctors as set by the Australian Government is the 
official measure of over and under supply in this country. Thus in Australia, districts of 
workforce shortage are regional rural and remote areas, as well as outer metropolitan 
areas in capital cities that are experiencing doctor shortages (Australian Department of 
Health and Ageing, 2005). 
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The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), of which 
Australia is a member, accepts that its member countries have different benchmarks by 
which physician shortages and surpluses are defined. This benchmark could be a 
minimum physician-to-patient ratio or a target number of physicians per capita in rural or 
deprived urban areas (Simoens & Hurst, 2006). In England for example, the National 
Health Service Plan has set a target of 0.56 FTE primary care physicians per 1,000 
population weighted for need in each area of England (Secretary of State for Health, 
2000). Similarly, in the U.S., a range of physician requirements of 0.6 to 0.8 primary care 
physicians per 1,000 population has been proposed (Council on Graduate Medical 
Education, 1994).  
 
Of relevance to policy-making is the point raised by Hawthorne & Birrell (2002), along 
with other observers such as Prideaux (2001) that Australia is experiencing a doctor 
shortage today because of policy choices made in the past. “Throughout the past decade 
medical workforce planning in Australia has been dominated by the view that there are 
too many doctors” (Hawthorne et al., 2002, p. 55). Concerns were raised in 1992 at 
Australia’s ‘persistent over supply of doctors’, with doctor/patient ratios increasing by 
approximately 67% over a 20 year period (Hawthorne et al., 2002). A major condition 
that led to this perceived over supply was an increase in the number of foreign-born 
overseas trained doctors securing professional registration.  
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However, the issue of surplus is controversial. Hawthorne et al. (2002) argue that various 
past policies have resulted in a considerable reduction over the years in the number of 
doctors, and general practitioners (GPs) in particular. Some government officials and 
medical school representatives agree with this standpoint but there are others who 
disagree.1 Rather, they argue that the problem appears because existing doctors are being 
under-utilised, not because there is an under supply.  
   
To understand the situation better, we review the current literature on the supply of 
doctors in developed and developing countries with a special interest in Australia. Where 
relevant, we will focus on the supply of the GP - defined by the Royal Australian College 
of General Practitioners (RACGP) as a medical practitioner who provides primary 
comprehensive and continuing care to patients and their families within the community 
(Britt, Miller, Knox, Charles, Valenti, Henderson, Pan, Sutton & Harrison, 2002). Finally 
we will look at the main suggestions offered so far in the literature to deal with the 
problem of supply imbalance. Before the literature is reviewed however, it is important to 
briefly discuss some of the differences in definition between the notions of demand and 
need in economics. This paper focuses on the concept of demand. 
 
Conventional demand theory assumes that consumers are sovereign, well informed, and 
make rational choices between different goods and services in order to maximise their 
utility (Mooney, 2003). However, it is difficult to apply conventional demand theory in 
its exact form in health economics, because often there is uncertainty and information 
asymmetry. Therefore, with respect to healthcare, Grossman (1972) suggests that 
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consumers’ demand is derived from their perception of their optimal level of health. In 
other words, individuals demand healthcare because they are unsatisfied with their 
current health state and wish to reach some higher health state, which they desire. 
 
Conversely, consumers may be unaware of their current and future health states, and 
hence would require a doctor to supply them with the necessary information for them to 
make a rational decision regarding their treatment choices (Mooney, 2003). This 
approach to healthcare, which is a merit good, is known as the ‘needs’ approach. A merit 
good is defined by Margolis (1982) as any item of public expenditure that is socially 
reasonable, but cannot be accounted for within the ordinary economic theory of demand. 
Thus, economists see need as an evaluative, normative notion that has some objective 
behind it. Need is not absolute or finite, rather it is dynamic and tends to grow over time 
(Mooney, 2003). Its growth can also be a function of the growth in healthcare supply. 
Because some needs will be more important than others, the extent to which certain needs 
are met will be a function of the marginal costs and benefits of doing so. This entails the 
performance of a cost-benefit analysis.  
 
Hence, consumer sovereignty, and therefore demand, clearly conflicts with the concept of 
need. However, demand at least possesses the crucial feature where individuals can 
assess their own benefits, and so is easier to handle in comparison to the concept to need, 
which is not only difficult to understand, but also requires a third party to be involved in 
the valuing process (Mooney, 2003). Therefore, this paper will approach the supply 
imbalance problem from the demand rather than the needs perspective. 
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2 IS THERE A SUPPLY IMBALANCE OF DOCTORS?  
 
A definition of supply imbalance from an economic perspective is given in the World 
Health Organization (WHO) paper by Zurn, Dal Poz, Stilwell & Adams (2004), who 
explain that imbalance occurs when the quantity of a given skill supplied by the 
workforce and quantity demanded by employers diverge at the existing market condition. 
In other words, a surplus or shortage is the result of disequilibrium between the demand 
and supply for that particular labour. Zurn et al. (2004) also suggest that a typology of 
supply imbalance of the medical workforce could be constructed. Of the numerous types 
of imbalances that could be identified, perhaps the most concerning are those relating to 
geography (urban and rural areas), government and private sectors, and to some extent 
professional specialisation. Our review of the literature is limited to these three areas.  
 
Of relevance to policy-making are the literature on (1) mobility issues relating to 
geographical and sectoral imbalances, (2) incentive issues (monetary and non-monetary) 
relating to medical specialisation imbalance and (3) government regulation issues relating 
to geographical, sectoral and professional specialisation imbalances. The literature that 
addresses the supply imbalance of the medical workforce is scarce as noted by Wharrad 
& Robinson (1999), even though international organisations such as the WHO and the 
World Bank have long recognised that the supply imbalance of doctors is a fundamental 
problem in many countries.  
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According to the World Bank’s World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health, 
the primary reasons for the supply imbalance of doctors in many countries include over-
concentration of medical specialists but not enough primary care providers, and a 
disproportionate number of the healthcare workforce employed in urban areas (World 
Bank, 1993). As well, training in public health was neglected, as were health policy and 
health management; and the cost of medical training was subsidised by public revenue 
even though many physicians work in the private sector and earn relatively high incomes 
(World Bank, 1993). Although the report is now outdated, many of its findings are still 
true in most countries. Having not heeded the warnings on supply imbalance, 
governments in many countries are now forced to face the consequences of not only 
dealing with an unequal allocation of doctors, but also a shortage of GPs, the primary 
care providers.  
 
More recent studies by the WHO not only support the findings of the World Bank report, 
but also raise additional reasons for the supply imbalance. For example, recent WHO 
papers by Diallo, Zurn, Gupta & Dal Poz (2003) and Zurn et al. (2004) have brought to 
our attention that the out-migration of doctors has created considerable difficulties for 
some developing countries desperate to provide adequate coverage of the essential 
healthcare services. This problem, commonly known as ‘brain drain’, can be external 
(out-migration to another country) and internal (rural-urban migration within a country). 
Many African doctors from the countries shown in Figure 1 for instance migrate within 
the continent, and mostly to Southern African states, where salaries are often higher.  
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Figure 1: Percentage of African medical practitioners who intend to migrate 
 
 
 
Source: Vujicic, Zurn, Diallo, Adams & Dal Poz, 2004, ‘The role of wages in the migration of health care 
professionals from developing countries’, Human Resources for Health, p. 11. 
 
The Australian Department of Health and Ageing provides a definition of GP shortage 
that is similar to its description of doctor shortage. Districts of workforce shortage for 
GPs are determined by comparing their supply of GPs with the national average supply. 
The national average is the ratio of FTE GPs to population. The department considers 
0.71:1,000 to be the standard GP to population ratio (the GP figure includes salaried 
practitioners and is based on FTEs), and uses this as a measure to demonstrate 
comparative workforce shortage (Australian Department of Health and Ageing, 2005). 
This information is based on Medicare billing data and the latest Australian Bureau of 
Statistics population data, and is updated quarterly. All Aboriginal Medical Services and 
after-hours-only services are considered districts of workforce shortage, regardless of 
their geographic location (Australian Department of Health and Ageing, 2005). 
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The Robin Hood Index has been used by Gravelle & Sutton (1998) and Kennedy, 
Kawachi & Prothrow-Stith (1996) to measure the unequal allocation of doctors, and is 
calculated as the number of GPs per person divided by the crude mortality rate 
(Wilkinson, 2000; Wilkinson & Symon, 1999). From their studies of the supply of GPs in 
Australia based on the Robin Hood Index, Wilkinson (2000) and Wilkinson et al. (1999) 
found some interesting results. The findings show that on average, there are 
approximately 920 people per full-time GP in Australia.  
 
Given that the Australian Department of Health and Ageing considers 0.71:1,000 to be 
the standard GP to population ratio, the findings of Wilkinson (2000) and Wilkinson et 
al. (1999) seem to suggest that on average, there is an over supply of GPs in Australia. In 
fact, a state-by-state comparison found that three states, namely South Australia, New 
South Wales (NSW) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) were relatively over 
supplied. The remaining states, namely Queensland, Western Australia (WA), Victoria, 
Tasmania, and the Northern Territory (NT) were relatively under supplied. Adjusted for 
estimated demand, the findings show that the ACT is over supplied by 71% in 
comparison to the rest of Australia, while WA is under supplied by 15% (Wilkinson, 
2000). 
 
In Australia, not only is the allocation of GPs between and within states and territories 
unequal, but also it is clear that capital cities are greatly over supplied when compared to 
the rural and remote areas of Australia (Wilkinson, 2000; Wilkinson et al., 1999). Indeed, 
the Australian Department of Health and Ageing supports this view, and asserts that most 
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rural and regional areas and many outer metropolitan areas in the capital cities are 
considered to be the districts of workforce shortage for GPs. The districts of workforce 
shortage for general practice do not generally include the inner metropolitan areas of the 
capital cities. Examples of districts of workforce shortage for GPs include Armidale, 
Broken Hill, Coffs Harbour, Dubbo, Goulburn, Kempsey, Lismore, Maitland, Port 
Stephens, Tamworth, Singleton, Wagga Wagga, Katoomba and Richmond in NSW; 
Tuggeranong in the ACT; Alice Springs, Katherine and Tennant Creek in the NT; Exeter 
and Bridgewater in Tasmania; Broome, Geraldton, Kalgoorlie and Port Headland in WA; 
Cloncurry, Esk, Gympie, Kelso, Mt Isa, Nerang, Port Douglas and Yeppoon in 
Queensland; Ballarat, Corio, Mildura, Swan Hill, Torquay, Hastings, Mornington 
Peninsula and Seaford in Victoria; and Mt Gambier, Port Wakefield and Piccadilly in SA 
(Australian Department of Health and Ageing, 2005). 
 
As Australia is highly urbanised, the implication is that most of the population (65%) is 
over supplied, relative to the national average, with the greatest over supply being in 
Sydney, where 33% fewer people share a full-time GP, compared to the whole of NSW 
(Wilkinson, 2000). On the other hand, the greatest under supply is in Queensland with 
133% more people sharing one GP. Table 1 shows the unequal distribution of employed 
practitioners in Australia between the cities, regional and remote areas. It should be noted 
that over half of the 43,010 practitioners employed in cities were specialists (14,580), 
specialists-in-training (5,116) or non-clinicians (3,621) (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, 2005). 
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Table 1: Employed practitioners in Australia, 2000 to 2003 
 
FTE rate (a) 
Major cities Inner regional Outer regional Remote Very remote Occupation 
2000 2003 2000 2003 2000 2003 2000 2003 2000 2003 
Clinicians 285 294 166 170 139 149 143 154 128 133 
    Primary care 105 102 88 89 83 85 99 97 100 95 
    Hospital non-specialist 32 36 18 17 13 19 21 24 21 30 
    Specialist 108 115 51 55 34 36 17 26 N/A 7 
    Specialist-in-training 40 42 9 9 10 10 6 7 5 N/A 
Non-clinicians 25 26 6 8 8 10 10 9 10 10 
Total 309 321 172 178 147 159 152 163 138 143 
 
Source adapted from: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2005, Medical Labour Force 2003, p. 12. 
(a) FTE rates are per 100,000 population and based on a 45-hour week. 
 
These findings confirm the well-documented fact that rural Australians have poorer 
access to medical services than their urban counterparts, as in the U.S., Canada and 
Britain (Ellsbury, Doescher & Hart, 2000; Wilkinson, 2000). Wilkinson et al. (1999) go 
further to suggest that 10-13% more GPs are required in Australia to ensure an equal 
national allocation. However, it should be noted that the accuracy of these predictions is 
questionable because the study used Census data reporting where GPs live and not where 
they work. Therefore, more research is needed in this area. In the next section, we focus 
on the discussion in the literature on three areas of supply imbalance: rural versus urban, 
government versus private, and the imbalance of professional specialisations.   
 
2.1 Geographical Imbalance of Supply 
 
Geographical imbalances are a concern in most countries (Blumentahl, 1994). The most 
worrying problem in many health systems is the rising trend of rural-to-urban brain drain. 
Adams & Hicks (2000) argue that in both industrialised and developing countries, urban 
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areas almost invariably have a substantially higher concentration of physicians than rural 
areas. They further add that while this pattern is not surprising, given that most healthcare 
professionals would prefer to settle in urban areas, where there are more opportunities 
and amenities; it is in the rural and remote areas that the most severe public health 
problems are found.  
 
Countries such as Australia have attempted to retain and deploy doctors in rural areas 
through a variety of methods. Van Lerberghe, Conceicao, Van Damme & Ferrinho 
(2002b) provide a discussion on such measures which include decentralising the location 
of training institutions, introducing recruitment quotas to ensure that the most peripheral 
areas are represented among medical students, and making rural field experience 
compulsory during medical training. They conclude that the results are mixed; the main 
constraint being the inequitable socio-economic development of rural areas compared to 
urban areas and the comparative social, cultural and professional advantages of cities. 
Cities offer doctors more opportunities to diversify earnings by working both in the 
government sector and in private practice. This rural-to-urban flow is compounded by 
government-to-private practice brain drain (Van Lerberghe et al., 2002b).  
 
2.2 Supply Imbalance between Government and Private Sectors 
 
In the literature (for example Humphrey & Russell, 2004; Gruen, Anwar, Begum, 
Killingsworth, & Normand, 2002; Van Lerberghe, Adams, & Ferrinho, 2002a; Van 
Lerberghe et al., 2002b), it is widely acknowledged that government health employees 
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boost their incomes with private practice; and sometimes in an ambiguous context that 
compromises their government related responsibilities. Often, the result is a supply 
imbalance between the government and private sectors. The dual system of healthcare 
delivery adopted in many developed and developing countries has unintentionally 
promoted this development. From a sample of 40 developing countries it has been found 
by Hanson & Berman (1998) that an average of 55% of physicians work in the private 
sector. Zurn et al. (2004) attempt to provide reasons for the unequal allocation of doctors 
by arguing that characteristics of the health system such as market failure are a cause of 
supply imbalance. They point out that even if governments attempt to correct market 
failures through policy interventions, implementing such policies may prove difficult. 
 
Problems can be exacerbated when policy-makers fail to modify their workforce policies 
according to the changing demands of the population. Keeping in mind that 0.71:1,000 is 
the ideal GP to population ratio in Australia, between 1984-1985 and 1998-1999 the 
average number of patients per full-time practising GP fell from 1,407 to 1,045 
respectively in the capital cities (Hawthorne et al., 2002). Although the practitioner rate 
rose from 267 to 283 practitioners per 100,000 population between 2000 and 2003, the 
average weekly hours worked per practitioner fell from 45.5 hours to 44.4 hours during 
the same period (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2005). As is shown in Table 
1, there was also a greater increase in the supply of practitioners in the major cities and in 
the outer regional areas (increase of 12 FTE per 100,000 population), than in the very 
remote areas (increase of 5 FTE per 100,000 population) (Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare, 2005). Hence, from the available statistics, it appears that Australia has a 
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surplus of doctors, especially GPs in some urban locations, but evidence points to the 
contrary in most rural areas (Prideaux, 2001; Australian Medical Workforce Advisory 
Committee, 2000).  
 
According to Stoddart et al. (1999), Canada was in a similar situation of surplus supply 
more than a decade ago when concerns were raised regarding the persistent surplus of 
doctors. In the years leading up to the deliberate policy reduction in doctor supply in 
Canada, the supply of physicians increased by 170% between 1964 and 1993 while the 
country’s population grew by only 48% (Stoddart et al., 1999). Some of the conditions 
that led to an over supply in Canada included a major expansion in domestic training 
capacity, and a lack of distribution across specialties that reflected the changing demands 
of the population. However, many rural and remote areas of Canada, like Australia, still 
remained relatively underserviced. On top of this, a modest 3% reduction in the 
physician/population ratio between 1993 and 1998, although on the heels of an 80% 
increase in that ratio over the previous 29 years, created an instant shortage (Stoddart et 
al., 1999). Hence, the above discussion highlights some of the serious effects a supply 
imbalance can have on the healthcare system.  
 
2.3 Imbalance of Medical Specialisation and Related Incentives 
 
Imbalance within the medical profession itself is a major issue in need of consideration. 
Table 2 for instance shows that practitioner numbers vary considerably across selected 
specialties in Australia. Although professional specialisation imbalances can arise for a 
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multitude of reasons, one important factor is incentives (monetary and normative). The 
World Health Report 2000 - Health Systems: Improving Performance defines incentives 
as all the rewards and punishments that providers face as a consequence of the 
organisations in which they work, the institutions under which they operate, and the 
specific interventions they provide (WHO, 2000).  
 
Table 2: Selected specialties: number of practitioners in Australia, 2000 to 2003 
 
Main occupation 2000 2001 2002 2003 
% 
change 
2000-03 
% 
change 
2002-03 
Average 
annual 
change 
(%) 
Specialty of practice 
Anaesthesia (incl. 
Intensive care - 
anaesthesia) 
2,120 2,368 2,491 2,524 19.10 1.30 6.00 
Emergency medicine 341 442 450 470 38.00 4.40 11.30 
General surgery 970 924 995 990 2.00 -0.60 0.70 
Obstetrics & 
gynaecology 1,001 1,123 1,119 1,179 17.70 5.40 5.60 
Psychiatry 1,984 1,937 2,167 2,177 9.70 0.50 3.10 
All specialties 16,008 17,124 17,762 18,093 13.00 1.90 4.20 
 
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2005, Medical Labour Force 2003, p. 6.  
 
It has also been noted in the literature (e.g. Adams et al., 2000; Kingma, 1999) that the 
choice of payment mechanisms in the health system can have major implications for the 
mode of practice and code of conduct because of the likely tension between financial 
incentives and professional values. Chaix-Couturier, Durand-Zaleski, Jolly & Durieux 
(2000) provide an example of such tension. They find for instance that salaried 
physicians are likely to refer patients to specialists less frequently than fee-for-service 
physicians. The effects of incentives were studied in three areas: financial impact on 
providers under capitation or shared-risk plans, risks to the quality of care, and the impact 
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on patient confidence (Chaix-Couturier et al., 2000; Dudley, Miller, Korenbrot & Luft, 
1999; Grumbach, Osmond, Vranizan, Jaffe & Bindman, 1998).  
 
3 REGULATED SUPPLY IN THE FORM OF ENTRY BARRIERS 
 
Literature on the topic of regulation is comparatively limited. This is understandable to a 
certain extent because while regulation has a role in the health system of most countries, 
the degree and type of regulations implemented are different from country to country. 
This makes the task of studying regulations more challenging. Available literature on 
medical workforce regulation in Australia, although limited, will be the main interest in 
this section.  
 
The type of regulation governing a profession can have a substantial impact on supply. 
The medical profession in most developed countries faces strict regulation. Doctors face 
considerable barriers to entry, which often include direct government intervention, and 
rules adopted by professional associations, whose self-regulatory powers allow them to 
set up entry requirements as well as rules of professional conduct (Van den Bergh, 1997; 
Zurn et al., 2004). Examples include those barriers with respect to the medical training 
and licensing of local and foreign-born overseas trained doctors. Even though the 
proponents of regulated supply claim that stringent barriers would promote high quality 
healthcare and protect patients from incompetent providers, the downside of such 
regulations is that they can provide the doctors as a group, with enormous market power 
(Zurn et al., 2004).  
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As noted by Noether, “economists have long recognised that the market for physician-
provided services cannot be described adequately by a purely competitive model” (1986, 
p. 504). He reminds us that the supply of physicians permitted to practice in the majority 
of developed countries has been restricted for a considerable period of time. In the U.S. 
as in other countries, successful barriers to entry have been maintained through a 
combination of medical school accreditation and mandatory state licensing of individual 
practitioners (Noether, 1986). The nature of a country’s barriers to entry into medical 
practice is an unstable factor, which could worsen the problem of supply imbalance. It is 
important to recognise that the existence of entry barriers to the medical profession in 
most developed countries is largely a result of the widely held view in the past that there 
were too many doctors in the medical workforce. In Australia, a range of measures was 
adopted in the 1990s as a response to the perceived surplus of doctors. Many of these 
measures, originally aimed to curb expansion of the medical workforce, are still in place 
today.   
 
The main regulations discussed by Hawthorne et al. (2002) and the Australian Medical 
Workforce Advisory Committee (2000), include reducing the number of medical school 
enrolments, points penalties to doctors applying to immigrate, the subsequent removal of 
the right of doctors to apply for migration as permanent residents under Australia’s points 
tested skilled migration categories, and placing a limitation on the number of entrants to 
the RACGP’s postgraduate training programme for GPs. Other regulations include 
restricting access to Medicare provider numbers to those who pass the RACGP training 
 17 
programme, and placing various restrictions on the circumstances under which foreign-
born overseas trained doctors can practise if they enter Australia with temporary 
employment contracts.  
 
The urgent demand for more doctors has led to a lowering of some of these entry barriers 
(e.g. employing more foreign-born overseas trained doctors on a temporary basis) to cope 
with an ageing population, an increase in the number of women in the medical workforce, 
public pressure for improved access and quality, and the growing shortage of doctors in 
rural areas (Australian Medical Workforce Advisory Committee, 2000). Consequently, 
the new policies introduced in Australia are to some extent contrary to the previous ones. 
To ease the shortage of GPs, particularly in rural Australia, foreign-born overseas trained 
doctors are offered contracts to work in pre-arranged employment. There has been a 
considerable increase in the number of overseas trained doctors arriving in Australia 
annually.  
 
Hawthorne et al. (2002) who studied the Australian situation have noted the surge in 
demand for temporary resident visas each year: 1,923 visas were issued in 2001-2002 
compared to 1,209 in 1997-1998, and just 664 in 1993-1994. Hence, owing to difficulties 
faced by employers in recruiting locally trained doctors (especially in specialisations and 
in locations where there are serious shortages), the Federal, State, Territory and Local 
Governments are now increasingly forced to rely on foreign-born overseas trained 
doctors to provide healthcare services in Australia (Hawthorne et al., 2002). 
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Despite Australia’s growing reliance on foreign-born overseas trained doctors the official 
view of the Australian Government is that there continues to be a surplus of doctors and  
“… that there is a distribution problem, not a deficiency problem” (Hawthorne et al., 
2002, p.57). However, this view is not held by the Australian Medical Association 
(AMA), which argues that there is no surplus of GPs in urban areas. In other developed 
countries similar developments have been observed. For example, public concern 
regarding the shortage of physicians in the U.S. has led to a substantial increase in the 
number of medical schools, and the number of medical graduates has more than doubled 
since the 1960s (Noether, 1986).  
 
In 1999, British authorities decided to expand the medical school intake by roughly 20%, 
and considered strategies to minimise medical student dropout rates (Goldacre, 1998). In 
Canada medical school enrolments have risen to solve the doctor supply problem 
(Stoddart et al., 1999). The general view in the literature is that the U.S., Canada and 
Britain are yet to achieve the objectives of their national medical workforce policies, that 
is, to train enough doctors locally to achieve self-sufficiency without relying on 
immigration, and to ensure that supply best matches demand (Goldacre, 1998; Horvath, 
Gavel, Harding, & Harris, 1998; Sullivan, Watanabe, Whitcombe & Kindig, 1996).  
 
4 MOBILITY TRENDS AMONG MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS 
 
Most relevant to our discussion on the supply imbalance of doctors is the extent of their 
labour mobility. Migration can be either internal or international, and we will look at the 
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literature on these types of migration. Diallo (2004) defines internal migration as the 
movement of doctors within national borders, across subnational administrative units, or 
between rural and urban areas. On the other hand, international migration describes the 
movement of doctors who temporarily or permanently settle abroad, mainly because of 
problems in their home country. Such international migrants may include those who are 
no longer working in the area of healthcare in the host country, foreign-born trainees and 
graduates who do not return to their home country, and migrants who eventually return to 
their home country and continue to work in healthcare (Diallo, 2004). Physicians in 
particular, tend to move abroad for training purposes (Forcier, Simoens & Giuffrida, 
2004). 
 
While migration can offer considerable benefits to both the home (the country from 
which the doctor is migrating) and the host (the country to which the doctor is migrating) 
countries, it can also create costs for the home and the host countries. The cost effects are 
rarely felt as strongly as in the healthcare sector. Brain drain not only can lead to severe 
repercussions for the home country, but may also produce consequences for the host 
country, especially if it is an economically developed country. Therefore, it is imperative 
to look into the literature on the impact of migration on the supply of doctors in various 
countries. The international migration of physicians is a prominent issue in the 21st 
Century. This fact is widely documented in the literature including Diallo (2004), 
Martineau, Decker & Bundred (2004), Pang, Lansang & Haines (2002), Saravia & 
Miranda (2004), Vujicic, Zurn, Diallo, Adams & Dal Poz (2004), and Stilwell, Diallo, 
Zurn, Dal Poz, Adams & Buchan (2003). They all attribute this migration to several 
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factors such as the lack of opportunity in home countries, a shortage of doctors in host 
countries, and rising demand for medical services as a result of the ageing population.  
 
Although both financial and non-financial incentives can motivate health professionals to 
relocate to another country as pointed out by Brown & Connell (2004) and Stilwell, 
Diallo, Zurn, Vujicic, Adams & Dal Poz (2004), enhanced employment prospects and the 
possibility of making substantially more money are the most commonly cited reasons for 
migrating to another country (Harrison, 1998; Stilwell et al., 2004; Vujicic et al., 2004). 
These factors can have serious implications for the health systems of the home and the 
host countries.  
 
In fact, Vujicic et al. (2004) have found that, even after adjusting for the difference in the 
cost of living, wage differences are large in their study, having carried out an analysis of 
data on wage differentials in the healthcare sector between home and host countries. They 
cite evidence to show that even in high-wage home countries, health sector salaries 
constitute only about one-third of the amount of salaries in developed host countries such 
as Australia, Canada, France, Britain and the U.S. As Figure 2 illustrates, the physician 
wage in the U.S. is roughly 25 times the physician wage in Zambia, approximately 22 
times the physician wage in Ghana, and about 4 times the physician wage in South Africa 
(Vujicic et al., 2004). Accordingly, they suggest that wage differentials between home 
and host countries are so large that small increases in healthcare wages in home countries 
are unlikely to have a major impact on the migration decision of doctors (Vujicic et al., 
2004).  
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Figure 2: Ratio of physician wages (PPP$US), host country to home country 
 
  
 
Source: Vujicic, Zurn, Diallo, Adams & Dal Poz, 2004, ‘The role of wages in the migration of health care 
professionals from developing countries’, Human Resources for Health, p. 9. 
 
The trend in the inflow of foreign-born overseas trained doctors is clearly different 
among the host countries, but the literature is uncertain on whether doctors make up the 
bulk or only a small proportion of the skilled migrants (Stilwell et al., 2003; Martineau et 
al., 2004). Researchers seem to hold opposing views on how the trend of inflow of 
foreign-born physicians has fluctuated. For instance, according to Vujicic et al. (2004) 
the proportion of foreign-born overseas trained doctors in Canada has decreased quite 
considerably. This view contradicts the findings of Forcier et al. (2004) who argue that 
foreign-born physicians make a substantial contribution (20.6%) to the national supply of 
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physicians in Canada. In other western OECD countries they also comprised more than 
20% of the total physician workforce in 2000 (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Percentage of practising foreign-born overseas trained doctors, 2000 
 
 
 
Source: Forcier, Simoens & Giuffrida, 2004, ‘Impact, regulation and health policy implications of 
physician migration in OECD countries’, Human Resources for Health, p. 4. 
 
Foreign-born overseas trained doctors can offer numerous benefits to host countries 
because foreign-born physicians are usually recruited to fill the gaps in local medical 
labour supply. The greatest benefit is that they are more flexible and willing than local-
born doctors to practise in less popular workplace settings. These may include less 
favourable working conditions such as night shifts, and certain geographical areas such as 
the rural areas, which many local-born physicians tend to avoid (Bundred & Levitt, 2000; 
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Forcier et al., 2004; Martineau et al., 2004; Williams, 1998). Recruitment of foreign-born 
overseas trained doctors to work in rural areas is not new; it is a convenient strategy to 
solve the problem of inadequate local supply in developed countries such as Australia, 
the U.S. and Britain. According to Table 3, the largest group of foreign-born overseas 
trained doctors employed in Australia between 1994 and 1996, were born in South Africa 
(75.3%) and Britain/Ireland (74.8%). However, as this data is a decade old, and more 
recent data is difficult to obtain, there is a need for a more updated study in this area. 
 
Table 3: Labour market outcomes for foreign-born overseas trained doctors by  
   country/region of birthplace, 1994-1996 arrivals 
 
Employment outcomes in Australia, percentage 
Birthplace Doctors Other professionals Unemployed 
Number 
in labour 
force 
Total 
number 
South 
Africa 75.30 11.10 0.00 9.90 81 
Britain/ 
Ireland 74.80 11.50 0.00 10.40 469 
India 50.20 4.50 11.70 31.30 265 
Hong 
Kong 40.50 25.70 4.10 4.10 74 
Malaysia 38.70 19.40 9.70 32.30 31 
Vietnam 30.00 0.00 15.00 47.50 40 
Southern 
Europe 10.20 0.00 30.50 59.30 59 
Philippines 7.90 7.90 23.70 50.00 38 
China 3.00 11.20 12.90 57.90 394 
Russia/ 
Balkans 2.70 2.70 16.10 67.90 112 
Lebanon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
Other 39.90 8.30 10.80 33.80 1,241 
Total 
overseas 39.90 9.00 9.70 33.80 2,804 
 
Source adapted from: Hawthorne et al., 2002, p. 59. 
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Other benefits for the host country include free riding on potential savings to be made 
from the cost of training and education (Martineau et al., 2004). Patients in the host 
country may benefit by better access to medical care and even reduced prices arising 
from increased competition between doctors, which may eventually improve the quality 
of services (Forcier et al., 2004). However, Martineau et al. (2004) warn that the host 
countries should see the recruitment of foreign-born physicians as only a temporary 
solution to their supply problems. Continuous reliance on migrant doctors may hinder the 
development of locally trained supply, and in some cases, there could be tension between 
the local interests of the country and its policy on overseas recruitment (Martineau et al. 
2004).   
 
Widespread international migration can in turn lead to what is known as rural-to-urban 
brain drain in the home countries. The ultimate losers of international migration tend to 
be the health service users in the rural areas because rural areas often come lowest in the 
ranking of preferred work locations. Thus, if a vacancy in the city arises owing to the 
incumbent migrating overseas, a reshuffle takes place whereby the rural physician fills 
the city vacancy (Martineau et al., 2004). Urban areas are often perceived to be more 
accommodating with respect to professional, family and social connections, and 
achieving professional ambitions (Zurn et al., 2004).  
 
The other main reasons for the high concentration of GPs in the cities are lifestyle-related 
(urban areas offer better access to amenities), spouse-related (more employment 
opportunities), and child-related (better schools and access to universities). However, 
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despite the seriousness of this issue, the available literature on the rural-to-urban brain 
drain of doctors is very limited compared to the literature on international migration. This 
may be because it is generally more difficult to collect data on mobility trends within a 
country than mobility trends from one country to another. “So far there is virtually no 
country in the world that has solved the problem of a rural/urban imbalance of the 
physician workforce” (Zurn et al., 2004, p. 11). 
 
5 SOME SOLUTIONS TO THE SHORT SUPPLY  
 
In their 2002 paper, Alwan and Hornby put forward what they believe to be the main 
obstacles facing human resources development in the health sector in many countries. 
They argue that in most countries there is no comprehensive national health development 
plan or strategy for health sector development, the prerequisites for health staff 
development are not in place, and the education programmes of academic institutions are 
not linked to the demands of the country. They also observe that policies of admission to 
the medical profession are unrealistic, insufficient attention is given to continuing 
education, primary healthcare and non-clinical activities are overlooked, and there is 
often little or no coordination between ministries of health, universities, training 
institutions and the demands of the population at large. 
 
Alwan et al. (2002) propose that each country should develop a national strategy for 
human resources for health, taking into account all of the above obstacles. While the 
development of such a broad strategy may not be easy and could take time, there are 
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other more specific and practical strategies that many countries could adopt to solve the 
problem of an unequal allocation of doctors from the geographical and sectoral aspects. 
For instance, Wibulpolprasert (1999) suggests that development of a rural health 
infrastructure will assist the allocation of doctors to rural areas. He has proposed a 
number of educational strategies to increase doctor supply. First, students could be 
recruited from rural areas for medical school admission, and there should be hometown 
placement after graduation. Medical students should be encouraged to acquire rural 
experience by utilising rural health facilities for training purposes. Lastly, fewer 
opportunities for private practice should be provided so that more medical graduates are 
kept in the government sector.  
 
Wibulpolprasert (1999) stresses that for these strategies to be effective the student 
recruits should be limited to those who grew up in the rural areas, and exclude those who 
purposely move their residence to rural areas 2-3 years before enrolment just to be 
eligible for admission. This proposal contradicts the current medical recruitment practice 
in Australia where even students living in the cities are allowed to apply for admission to 
rural medical schools. “Only consistent, integrated, unified rational strategies supported 
by social and political commitment can guarantee the success of solving social inequity 
and inequity in the distribution of doctors” (Wibulpolprasert, 1999, p. 21).  
 
 Wibulpolprasert (1999) also notes that rural recruitment and training has proved to be 
quite effective in achieving rural allocation of doctors in Australia and the U.S. 
Moreover, he states that the establishment of regional medical schools is a good measure 
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for a more balanced allocation of doctors. A measure that could keep medical graduates 
in the government sector is to provide medical licenses to graduates only after they have 
completed a period of government work (Wibulpolprasert, 1999).  
 
Whilst it is unlikely that the debate regarding doctor shortage in Australia will be settled 
soon, there are some steps the government could immediately take to improve the supply 
situation. It is important for policy-makers to realise that the reliance on foreign-born 
overseas trained doctors to fill the gaps in supply cannot be a permanent solution. 
Therefore, it is difficult to see how the medical workforce crisis can be solved without 
increasing the number of doctors being trained in Australia (Hawthorne et al., 2002). This 
means that the current quota for medical school places in Australia will have to increase 
and more funding should be allocated to medical schools.  
 
As Prideaux (2001) points out, all of the government funded medical schools in Australia 
have suffered cuts in their operating grants since 1996 (the term of the current Australian 
Government). This has come on top of a major restructuring of Australian universities at 
the beginning of the 1990s, as well as cuts in the funding of government hospitals for 
more than a decade, including all teaching hospitals. This suppressive environment has 
made it difficult for medical schools to enhance their programmes in an appropriate and 
effective way (Prideaux, 2001). Another move to improve supply is to increase the 
number of places available under the RACGP’s postgraduate training programme for GPs 
in order to address the chronic shortage of GPs, particularly in rural areas (Hawthorne et 
al., 2002). At least a step in the right direction is the Australian Government funding for a 
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medical school at James Cook University in Northern Queensland, and nine more rural 
clinical schools around Australia, including Victoria’s first rural medical school at 
Deakin University, the University of Western Sydney, University of Wollongong and the 
University of Notre Dame (Australian Medical Workforce Advisory Committee, 2000).  
 
Given the inadequacy of the academic literature in this important area, more studies need 
to be conducted on the impact of regulation on the supply of doctors. The newly 
emerging trend of setting up private medical schools has occurred not only in Australia 
but also in other countries. While the establishment of new medical schools, especially 
private medical schools, is a highly controversial issue in Australia, the benefits and costs 
of this relatively new phenomenon is yet to be analysed in the literature. In fact, the 
overall literature on private medical schools is inadequate.  
 
The main concerns that have surfaced with respect to private medical schools are to do 
with equality of opportunities. As for new medical schools in general, the Australian 
Medical Students Association (AMSA) believes that they should only be established if 
doing so would serve the section of the Australian population currently under-represented 
in the demography of medical students and graduates (Australian Medical Students 
Association, 2002). For example, the medical school at James Cook University 
(Australia’s only rural medical school) was established with the main purpose of 
increasing the enrolment of students from rural and indigenous backgrounds (Prideaux, 
2001).  
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Currently, the Australian medical student population is composed mainly of students 
from the higher income groups who can afford to pay the Higher Education Contribution 
Scheme-Higher Education Loan Programme (HECS-HELP) fees for medicine costing a 
total of approximately $50,000 for a 6-year course. As a result, a major equity issue has 
arisen with regards to medical education in the belief that prospective medical students 
from a relatively high socio-economic background may have a better chance of studying 
medicine than those from a lower socio-economic background (Australian Medical 
Students Association, 2002). Hence, for the moment at least, the demography of medical 
students cannot be described as egalitarian. The creation of private medical schools may 
compound this problem because private universities would charge fees higher than 
HECS-HELP. For instance, local students in the new medical programme at Bond 
University on the Gold Coast must pay $46,620 in tuition fees per annum, with annual 
increments reflecting increased costs (Bond University, 2006). 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this paper was to review the current literature on the supply of doctors in 
developed and developing countries, focusing particular attention on Australia. With this 
in mind, the paper evaluated the literature that was the most relevant to policy-makers in 
the area of medical workforce planning. The literature review was confined to (1) 
mobility issues relating to geographical and sectoral imbalances, (2) incentive issues 
(monetary and non-monetary) relating to medical specialisation imbalance and (3) 
government regulation issues relating to geographical, sectoral and professional 
 30 
specialisation imbalances. The paper utilised the definition of doctor shortage and the 
accepted ratio of patients to FTE doctors that was provided by the Australian 
Government’s Department of Health and Ageing. The department considers 0.71:1,000 to 
be the standard doctor to population ratio, and uses this as a measure to demonstrate 
comparative workforce shortage (Australian Department of Health and Ageing, 2005). 
 
With respect to geographical and sectoral imbalances, the findings clearly indicate that 
rural-to-urban brain drain is a considerable problem in many developed countries. For 
example, the findings confirm that rural Australians have poorer access to medical 
services in comparison to their urban counterparts, and this situation is also present in the 
U.S., Canada and Britain. To remedy the situation, Australia has tried to retain and 
deploy doctors in rural areas utilising various methods. However, the results have been 
mixed. Government-to-private practice brain drain has also been found to compound 
rural-to-urban brain drain.  
 
Government regulation can further exacerbate the supply imbalance problem. In most 
developed countries including Australia, entry barriers were initially put in place as a 
result of the view that there were too many doctors in the medical workforce. However, 
due to the growing shortage of doctors, especially in rural areas, many of these entry 
barriers have since been lowered. Now governments in Australia are forced to rely on 
foreign-born overseas trained doctors to provide healthcare services. This however, is not 
a lasting solution to this problem. More permanent solutions include increasing the quota 
for medical school places in Australia, and allocating more funding to medical schools 
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and teaching hospitals. Other policy suggestions to rectify supply imbalance in developed 
and developing countries include establishing rural health infrastructure to assist in the 
allocation of doctors to rural areas, recruiting student from rural areas for medical school 
admission, and restricting opportunities for private practice so that medical graduates are 
kept in the government sector. 
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